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9 JUDGE BENCH: 
10 ATD: 





And we'll move now to our 10:30 case, State against Rosa-Re. Did I say 
that correctly? 
I'm sorry? 
Did I say that correctly? 
Yes, Your Honor. 
All right. We have Ms. Jones here representing the appellant. Would you 
like to reserve any of your 15 minutes? 
Yes, Your Honor, I'd like to reserve four minutes if I may. 
Four? 
Yes, Your Honor. 
I'll try to help you. 
May it please the Court, counsel. This case concerns discrimination in the 
jury selection process. The issue is referred to as a Batson challenge. 
Under Baison v Kentucky and its progeny, the United States Supreme 
Court has ruled that a prosecutor may not use peremptory strikes for 
1 
gender or racial reasons. In addition, in J.E.B. v. Alabama the United 
States Supreme Court ruled in that case, where the defendant was male, 
where the issues in the case were gender sensitive - for example, sexual 
harassment, sexual assault, paternity, domestic violence - the prosecutor's 
pattern of removing men from the jury violated the Equal Protection 
provision of the federal constitution. In this case, we maintain that the 
prosecutor discriminated for gender reasons when he used three of his four 
peremptory strikes to remove all of the men who presumptively would sit 
on the jury panel in a case for sexual assault. Now in a case.... 
You also, at least the defense, the defense also removed the same number 
of men. Am I right about that? 
The defense removed three men and one woman, and the State has 
conceded that the defendant's reason for removing men was legitimate. In 
addition, the rule in J.E.B., the rule in Bat son, precludes a prosecutor - the 
State - from engaging in discriminatory conduct. So the fact that the 
defendant removed men is actually irrelevant. I would refer the Court to 
J.E.B. again: J.E.B. v. Alabama. In that case the defendant removed all 
women, and that was not relevant to the Court's analysis in finally 
concluding that the State there had discriminated for gender reasons. 
Under the Batson line of cases there's a three part test that federal 
Courts and Utah courts apply to determine if there has been discrimination 
in the jury selection process. Under the first step of the test the person 
raising the Batson challenge - in this case, the defendant - is required to 
2 
1 present a prima facie case of discrimination. Here there is really no 
2 relevant dispute about the first step. The prosecutor used 75 percent of his 
3 peremptory challenges against the three men who presumptively would sit 
4 on the jury. It's a case where the defendant is male, the victim is male, 
5 and the case concerned gender sensitive issues. It was a sexual assault 
6 case. There's no... . 
7 JUDGE MCHIJGH: Let me interrupt you, where both the defendant and the victim are male, 
8 does it really weigh one way or another to have men on the jury or not on 
9 the jury? 
10 ATD: It is certainly still a gender sensitive case. I think men tend to be less 
11 sympathetic to victims who claim sexual harassment and sexual assault. 
12 They tend to be more cautious in weighing the information. I am making 
13 generalizations, but it's these very generalizations that should not be 
14 weighing in on the prosecutor's decisions in making peremptory strikes. 
15 JUDGE DAVIS: Does it matter anyway in this case, because didn't the prosecutor then just 
16 jump right in and give an explanation without challenging whether there 
17 was a prima facie Bat son challenge? 
18 ATD: And that is the second step, Your Honor. The prosecutor is required to 
19 give an explanation. Under the law the explanation is required to be 
20 neutral, clear and specific, related to the case, and legitimate. And in this 
21 case the prosecutor's explanations were none of those things. 
22 Under the third step of the Bat son analysis, the trial court then 
23 considers whether there was discrimination in the selection process. The 
3 
United States Supreme Court ruled in Miller-El v. Dretke, and in Johnson 
v. California, that the question in the third step really focuses on the 
persuasiveness of the prosecutor's explanation. In the J.E.B. case the 
United States Supreme Court stated that the prosecutor's explanations 
must be exceedingly persuasive. 
But this Balson process needs to be concluded prior to the jury being 
sworn and the remaining venire being discharged. Isn't that the thrust of 
Valdez IP. 
The thrust of Valdez II is the defense needs to raise the issue before the 
jury is empanelled and the rest of the venire is dismissed. And the trial 
court certainly needs to resolve the issue quickly. Where the trial court 
doesn't do that, that's trial court error. 
So procedurally, at least, what this case boils down to is whose 
responsibility was it that the Balson process was not concluded one way or 
another, prior to the jury being sworn and the rest of the venire being 
excused, because at that point in time the trial judge couldn't do anything 
about it anyway. 
Well, and the answer to that question, Your Honor, is that the trial court is 
ultimately responsible for seeing that the Balson issue is resolved. It's the 
trial court that must make the quick determination under the clear 
guidelines of Balson, a process that is intended to give transparency to the 
prosecutor's reasons for removing veniremen from the panel. It's the trial 
court that holds that responsibility. I would refer the Court to State v. 
4 
Pharris, Stale v. Cannon - cases decided by this Court - where the trial 
court simply skipped over that second step; skipped over that second step 
and this Court remanded for further proceedings under the Batson 
analysis. Now how is it different if the trial court skips over the step or 
waits until after it empanels the jury and then uses that as a reason to deny 
the Batson challenge? 
Let me focus you on footnote number 19 in Valdez II, which basically says 
that the Redd decision would be decided differently after Valdez II And 
the facts of Redd are very similar to what we're dealing with here. 
Doesn't - and Valdez II is after the cases that you've just referred us to -1 
mean, don't we have pretty clear marching orders from the Utah Supreme 
Court about whose responsibility it is to see that the entire analysis is 
completed before the venire is discharged? 
And I don't know how that responsibility could completely fall on the 
defendant when he is required to make the objection and present the prima 
facie case and then the trial court - conducting the proceedings - the trial 
court who knows the Batson analysis, needs to move on to that second 
step with the prosecution. The defendant has done what he needs to do 
and under Redd v. Negley - I think is the name of the case - I think that 
case is unclear. But there the parties approached the bench and it appears 
that the defendant, I believe it was the defendant, asked to reserve the 
opportunity to make an objection. The defendant didn't make the 
objection; asked for the opportunity to reserve some time to make that 
5 
1 objection. So that case is distinguishable from this case where the defense 
2 in this case, in fact, approached the bench, raised the Batson issue, 
3 specifically said "we're challenging the prosecutor's peremptory strikes 
4 under Baison ", identified gender as the reason, indicated that the 
5 seriousness of the charges required it, and these are sexual assault charges. 
6 That's what the defense was required to do, and that's what the defense 
7 did in this case. 
8 JUDGE DAVIS: Well, so far so good. But what about the effect of the defense attorney 
9 basically passing on the jury subsequently without the Baison issue having 
10 been resolved? 
11 ATD: Well, that is really a pro forma statement. We see that time and again in 
12 trials. And you're referring to the point, Your Honor, when the judge 
13 asked "Is this the jury that you have selected?" And defense counsel 
14 indicates that it is. In fact, the defendant had not objected to any of the 
15 individuals sitting on the jury, the defendant had no objection to women 
16 sitting on the jury; the full objection here is that the prosecutor allowed 
17 discrimination to taint the selection process. That objection had been 
18 made at that point. The issue was not waived by that statement, it's 
19 simply a pro forma statement. It's the sort of statement we see when a 
20 losing party signs the form of the order. That does not constitute waiver; 
21 it's SLpro forma statement. 
22 JUDGE MCIIUGII: Well, but in that case it's you approve as to form and reserve as to 
23 substance, I mean, that's what people do when they approve an order 
6 
1 where they lost. In this case, there's a reason why we go through these 
2 steps and it isn't just pro forma. If you don't agree with the jury you have 
3 to, there's no way to fix it once the venire is dismissed, and I think that 
4 Valdez IIS that's the whole point of that case is that we don't make 
5 objections in the trial court just to make the appellate court happy that 
6 we've preserved it. We make objections in the trial court so that the trial 
7 judge has a real opportunity to fix the problem before it can't be fixed. 
8 ATI): And the trial judge had that opportunity here and failed in two reasons: 
9 failed to immediately resolve the issue and failed to resolve the issue 
10 properly. Let's not lose sight of who has the obligation once the defendant 
11 makes the objection. The trial court needs to take control of this. And 
12 time and again courts have ruled, where the trial court skipped the second 
13 step, disregarded the second step, didn't move on to the second step, that 
14 requires remand. If the trial court had completely blown the defendant off 
15 here, that would require remand in this case. In Batson v. Kentucky the 
16 defendant made an objection, the trial court essentially blew the defendant 
17 off, rejected it and proceeded with the trial. Batson v. Kentucky was 
18 reversed and remanded. That's the situation we have here, a situation 
19 where the defendant has made a proper objection and the trial court failed 
20 to properly address it and resolve it. 
21 JUDGE BENCH: Two things really at play here. One is the changing landscape with the 
22 law. Defense probably would have done it differently if they had the 
23 advantage of Valdez II at the time of this trial. That's one part of this. I 
7 
guess the other pail of it is that to require the defendant to continue to 
object here could put him in the position of getting into an argument with 
the court. "No, you can't go forward, Your Honor, until you do this." So 
there kind of is some interesting conflicting positions here. 
Well, I do believe that the defense counsel did all that defense counsel was 
required to do in this case. It was then up to the court to resolve it. And 
Your Honor is absolutely correct that once defense counsel makes that 
objection and the prima facie case, the defendant is not required to debate 
it with the court or even debate it with the prosecutor. In Miller-El v. 
Dretke, that's precisely what happened. The defense then contested the 
prosecutor's explanation and the United States Supreme Court went on to 
say that when the prosecutor provided more excuses for removing those 
veniremen, it reeked of after-thought. 
This is a process that wants to look at the prosecutor's reasons for 
striking veniremen, and his original answers are really what is at play and 
what is most telling. I can see I'm into my rebuttal time. I'd like to 
quickly address the three individuals who were stricken here. 
The first was Jed Worley. The prosecutor - under step two -
explained that he struck Mr. Worley for lack of education. But as we look 
at the record under step three, as we look at the explanation in light of the 
record, we sec that Mr. Worley didn't say anything about education, he 
didn't say where he went to High School, whether he went to college, he 
didn't talk about education at all. And in this case the prosecutor didn't 
8 
ask about it. Well, the United States Supreme Court in Miller-El v Dretke 
- in a footnote there - said ''where the prosecutor doesn't ask, it 
undermines his explanation". 
In addition with respect to the other two jurors, Mr. Tidwell and 
Mr. Jensen, they had as much to offer a jury as any person who actually 
sat on that jury. They had as much in terms of education, life experience, 
life choices, disciplined careers. Yet the prosecutor in this case claims that 
he struck Mr. Tidwell because of a gut instinct that Mr. Tidwell had 
nothing to offer. This man, Mr. Tidwell, had a college education, he was 
an engineer, he was a father, he was a husband, he sat on a jury in the past. 
The prosecutor claimed that he struck Mr. Jensen because he had a 
personal opinion that Mr. Jensen wouldn't give the matter attention. Mr. 
Jensen was a father and a husband, he was a man who went to college for 
two years, he was an executive officer for a Utah corporation, he sat on a 
jury in the past. 
The explanations given by the prosecutor in this case were vague, 
ambiguous, they were illegitimate, they were not gender neutral 
explanations. And for that reason the explanations constituted a pretext 
for discrimination and we're asking this Court to reverse the conviction 
for a new trial in light of the Batson violations. And I will reserve my 
remaining time for rebuttal. 
Two minutes on rebuttal, there if you would. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
9 
1 JUDGE BENCH: Ms. Soltis. 
2 ATP: Thank you, Your Honor. May it please the Court, Christine Soltis 
3 appearing on behalf of the State, and counsel. I'd like to just very briefly, 
4 I was planning on submitting the timeliness issue on the briefs, because I 
5 think that there's so much to talk about in relationship to this case, in 
6 relationship to the Balson analysis, that the defendant is proposing. But I 
7 would like to just mention this; this is not just & pro forma passing of the 
8 jury. If in fact the defendant believes that jurors have been discriminated 
9 against and removed from the panel, the panel is not properly empanelled. 
10 And the resolution for a Boston is to replace the jurors who were 
11 unlawfully removed. So, there is a burden and that's exactly what Valdez 
12 // says. We are talking structural error here. This is not simply a remand 
13 situation. The defendant is asking this Court to reverse an otherwise valid 
14 conviction, and yet all that they have done is the most minimal amount to 
15 even raise this issue or to see it resolved at the proper time before the 
16 court. 
17 JUDGE MCIIUGH: What about counsel's argument that you're in the middle of trial, you very 
18 clearly stated you have an objection based on gender discrimination under 
19 the Batson/J.E.B. line of cases and the court says, "Okay, fine. I'll get to 
20 that later." How much do you have to do? At what point do you risk 
21 alienating the court to your client? 
22 ATP: Having been a trial attorney - both as a defense attorney and a prosecutor 
23 for many years - I don't think that it's very hard. There is nothing that 
10 
1 was hostile here, in feet the court kept saying, "Well, okay, is that okay, 
2 are you happy now, is this the jury that's okay?" All he had to do at that 
3 point is say "Whoops, Your Honor, let me explain. You can't actually 
4 release this group. You need to recall this issue." That's all, there was no 
5 hostility here. At one point they were up at the bench. That's all he had to 
6 say. "No, Your Honor, you really have to do it here." And if he thinks 
7 that there's any confusion, you don't get up and invite the court to dismiss 
8 the jury, and that's what they did here. 
9 Let me turn to the Batson analysis itself, because I think that what 
10 the defendant is proposing to this Court is not Batson. It is an 
11 interpretation of Batson that derives from four decisions of this Court: 
12 Valdez I, which really has no authority at this point and is dicta after Valdz 
13 II; State v. Jensen, which did result in a reversal of a conviction; State v. 
14 Chatwin which resulted in a reversal of a conviction; and State v. Cannon. 
15 Even though Cannon was actually the right result in relationship to that 
16 case, but it was kind of the bud that started the Chatwin line of cases, 
17 because what Cannon did is transpose factors from step three onto step 
18 two, and I'll explain this much more fully as I go on. 
19 But the Valdez, Jensen, and Chatwin line of cases, the Chatwin line 
20 of cases, they also relieved the defendant of their burden of persuasion and 
21 they erroneously stop at step two. What essentially the defendant is 
22 asking this Court to do is view a three-part Batson analysis as a two-part 
23 Batson analysis. And there are no U.S. Supreme Court cases that permit 
11 
1 the issue of Batson to be totally resolved at stage two. This is not - and 
2 when I say that these cases, Chatwin, Cannon, Valdez 1, and Jensen, are 
3 incorrect - this is not simply a situation, as many times where we argue 
4 our interpretation of the cases up here and the defense argues theirs, the 
5 exact analytical model that the defense is proposing to you has been 
6 resoundly and expressly rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. It was 
7 rejected in Hernandez v. New York, it was rejected in Plunckett v. Elm, 
8 and it was most recently rejected in Johnson v. California. It is also 
9 inconsistent with Utah precedent. It is inconsistent with State v Caldwell 
10 of the Utah Supreme Court and State v. Iliggenbotham. It is inconsistent 
11 with this Court's opinions in State v. Bowman and State v. Merrill. The 
12 State is not asking this Court for new law, it is asking for a re-alignment to 
13 bring the case law of this Court in conformity with the United States 
14 Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court and its prior decisions before 
15 Cannon, Jensen, Chatwin, and Valdez L 
16 Let me first say one of the most important, I think, and underlying 
17 aspects ofBatson analysis, and I think it's what drives all of the Bat son 
18 analysis because frankly, the cases can be a bit confusing. I think 
19 sometimes that they can be a little careless in their terminology, they don't 
20 always clearly define which step they're talking about, whether it's step 
21 two or three, unless you closely analyze the cases. But the single factor 
22 that resolves all of these cases and brings them into alignment is the 
23 agreement by everyone, even in the cases that the defendant cites, that the 
12 
1 burden of persuasion never leaves the defendant, and I'm using that 
2 terminology as the opponent of the strike. Never leaves. 
3 And if you bear the risk, the burden of persuasion, you must also 
4 bear the risk of non-persuasion. Those two simply cannot be separated. If 
5 they carry the burden of persuasion, how can the State ever be at the risk, 
6 carry a risk of non-persuasion? The State may fail in providing an 
7 explanation under step two. Johnson recognized that. Johnson recognized 
8 that the State in Purkett, you could be, it was silly, you could give a 
9 frivolous explanation. But the reason why Batson always proceeds to step 
10 three is because that is where the burden of persuasion is resolved. That is 
11 where Batson is resolved. Steps one and two are simply production 
12 stages. In stage one the defendant is to come forward and produce & prima 
13 facie case. In step two, ideally the prosecutor should come forward and 
14 present a facially neutral explanation. Well, what if they don't, what if 
15 they actually just remain silent? What if they simply said, "I don't know, I 
16 don't want to answer that question"? Well Johnson addressed that specific 
17 scenario. Johnson said even in the hypothetical of a prosecutor remaining 
18 totally silent, that does not end the inquiry. And why not? Because the 
19 burden of persuasion is with the defendant and the risk of non-persuasion 
20 is with the defendant. It is simply a circumstance which goes into the pot 
21 of step three. And in step three.... 
13 








6 JUDGE DAVIS: 
ATP: 
8 JUDGE DAVIS: 
9 ATP: 
15 JUDGE DAVIS: 
18 ATP: 






So even if you don't reach step three, then, you are suggesting that the 
burden of persuasion essentially picks up the - or places the burden to get 
to step three, on the defendant, is that basically how the argument runs? 
No. In some ways, yes, Your Honor, but I think it's even simpler. Bat son 
is a three-part inquiry... 
Right. 
... and you have to then use all three parts. If it's a three-part test.... 
Right. 
.. .you don't simply use two parts. The burden of persuasion, the burden 
of proving actual discriminatory intent is on the defendant. And I 
analogize it to this: In a criminal case the burden of persuasion is always 
on the State. Now, the defense may put on a good defense, they may put 
on a poor defense, they may remain silent; but the case still is going to 
proceed, assuming that the State made its prima facie case. 
But you're saying that that burden essentially picks up and places the 
responsibility on the defense attorney to see to it that the court gets to step 
three then. 
Absolutely. 
Isn't that your argument? 
Yes. Well, it places it for all purposes, it places it to make an adequate 
record, which this Court actually recognized, it places the burden on them 
to raise the objection, it places the burden on them to make sure that all 










or whether that is facts that they are claiming dispute - be explanations 
given by the prosecutor, it's their responsibility. It is their motion. There 
is no presumption that a peremptory strike was discriminatory. The 
presumption is that the peremptory strike was proper. And unless and 
until they carry their burden of persuasion and actually proceed to step 
three and get an actual resolution of that question of whether or not the 
strike was in fact exercised with purposeful discrimination, there is no 
Batson violation. 
9 JUDGE DAVIS: So it's broader than a fact inquiry? It picks up the process, the 
10 responsibility, if you will, of making sure that the court reaches step three 
11 and rules on it. 
12 ATP: Yes. 
13 JUDGE DAVIS: Okay. 
14 JUDGE MCHUGH: From our perspective reviewing it, if the step-two phase, there is no 
15 explanation from the prosecutor or the explanations are vague or not 
16 specifically tied to this case, I assume that you would agree that in 
17 determining how much discretion we would give the trial court in making 
18 it's step-three analysis, we would look at what did or didn't come in on the 





I don't think that it affects the discretion, but it does affect the whole 
assessment of step three. Step-three is a pot, and in that pot goes all the 
circumstances involving the voir dire. In the pot goes the strength or 
15 
weakness ofthe prima facie case, whether or not the State challenged it or 
not, the facts alleged in the prima facie case go into the step-three pot. 
Additionally the prosecutor's explanations or lack of explanations, go into 
the step-three pot. So in the circumstance that the explanations are weak 
or that there's no explanations given, that certainly is a circumstance that 
needs to be considered, just as the strength or weakness of'the prima facie 
case is a circumstance that needs to be considered. But additionally, what 
else goes into the pot? Pretty much anything else that has to do with the 
voir dire, including the court's own observations, including the court's 
assessment of the credibility of the defendant, including in such cases as 
Miller El, if there is a pattern or a policy of discrimination that is being 
promoted by that office. So all of these go into the pot. But step-three 
itself is a factual finding. 
The issue of whether a strike was exercised with discriminatory 
intent is a factual finding that is not disputed by the defendant. And 
because if s a factual finding and because it is so dependent upon the 
observations of the trial court and the assessment by the trial court of the 
credibility of the prosecutor, because what you're really asking is the trial 
court to determine motivation. They are supposed to look at every fact 
that they know and say, "Well, has the defense carried their burden to 
show that there was a gap in the illegal motivation?" 
[inaudible] version is sounding a little bit like this may well have been the 













16 JUDGED A VIS: 
17 
18 ATP: 
19 JUDGE DAVIS: 
20 ATP: 
21 JUDGE BENCH: 
22 ATD: 
23 
Well, he did go to step three, Your Honor, in this case. He fully resolved 
this issue and went to step-three. 
But this was after the fact, after the jury had been sworn, right? 
Yes. 
Okay. 
Yes, well, and I perfectly agree that in the ideal world obviously we want 
everybody to do their jobs. I certainly don't dispute that. Everybody 
should be doing their jobs and frankly the prosecutor could have also 
stepped up. That is true, Your Honor. But ultimately because it is their 
motion, and because it is their claim, and because they do carry the 
burden, it is primarily the defendant's responsibility and he has the 
greatest advantage and the only advantage by not allowing it to be 
resolved, because this is structural error. By not allowing it to be resolved 
he has planted error then, that the only recourse if this Court found that 
there was a Batson violation.... 
And your argument bumps up a little bit into the area of the invited error, 
almost, doesn't it? 
Yes, it docs. 
Okay. 
I sec that my lime is up, thank you. 
Thank you for your argument. Two minutes, Ms. Jones. 
Thank you, Your Honor. The Balson process is intended to give 
transparency to the prosecutor's reasons for removing specific veniremen 
17 
1 from the jury panel; it is raised in the heat of trial, it is something done on 
2 the fly. The U.S. Supreme Court has made it a very straight-forward test, 
3 and in Miller-El v. Dretke the United States Supreme Court has said that 
4 parties and courts should be well familiar with Bats on by now. 
5 The U.S. Supreme Court in Johnson v. Valdez and the Utah 
6 Supreme Court - I'm sorry, Johnson v. California, and the Utah Supreme 
7 Court in Valdez - indicated that if, if the prosecutor's explanations are 
8 sufficient, then you move on to step three. Well we have to assume that 
9 the other part of that statement is true - if the prosecutor's statements and 
10 explanations are not sufficient, step three ought to be quite clear to the trial 
11 court. 
12 To be sufficient the prosecutor's explanations must be neutral, 
13 related to the case, clear and specific, and legitimate. In addition, in 
14 Miller-El v. Dretke the Court stated that the prosecutor should understand 
15 by now that he will stand or fall on his own explanations. The whole jury 
16 panel will stand or fall on that prosecutor's explanations. If they're not 
17 legitimate then the prosecutor's explanations fall. In J.E.B. the United 
18 States Supreme Court said that the explanations must be exceedingly 
19 persuasive. Here the prosecutor's explanations were not. He remained 
20 ignorant about Mr. Worley's education, and yet used that as a basis to 
21 strike him. He stated that he struck Mr. Tidwell because of a gut instinct; 
22 and he struck Mr, Jensen because of a personal opinion. Those 
23 explanations are vague, illegitimate, ambiguous and problematic. The 
18 
1 prosecutor's explanations here were not sufficient to allow the court to 
2 proceed with trial in light of the Batson violations. And for that reason we 
3 ask this Court to reverse the trial court. 
4 JUDGE BENCH: Thank you both for your excellent arguments this morning. Yet another 
5 interesting case and we'll take this matter under advisement and let you 
6 know by written decision, and we'll be adjourned for the day. 
19 
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